Ethnofederalism has been contested as a solution for diverse societies as seen recently in Nepal (where federalism has been accepted, but the design and number of units remains heavily contested) and Myanmar (where ethnic minority demands for increasing federalization have had to take a back seat to the demands for increasing democracy). It remains a heavily contested subject in Sri Lanka. Concerns are expressed that ethnofederalism will increase pressures for secession and/or lead to increased violence through increasing a sense of separateness of the people living within that territory, providing resources for political entrepreneurs to mobilize groups against the center and will lead to the persecution of minorities within the ethnofederal units. India is an example of a federation that appears to demonstrate that ethnofederalism decreases rather than increases conflict through its successful reorganization of states along linguistic lines. However, a group-level analysis reveals a more diverse picture. India has simultaneously been both a success and a failure at conflict management.
In terms of population, India is the world's largest multinational federation. It contains a large number of sizeable religious, linguistic, caste, and tribal groups, plus many regional divisions. It is not unique in its diversity. However, it was one of the few decolonizing states that purposively incorporated that diversity into its constitution through territorial recognition and territorial redesign. Most other decolonizing states saw the politics of territorial recognition as divisive and as a threat to their territorial integrity (Pakistan and Ceylon, for example).
Through the process of linguistic reorganization, India became what is known in the political science literature as an ethnofederation, where at least one unit of the federation is associated purposively with an "ethnic" category. Ethnofederalism has received a bad press; both in the policy world, from statesmen working on constitution formation in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Nepal, and Myanmar, and in academia. In 1972 Eric Nordlinger 1 went so far as to exclude it from his list of conflict regulation devices. In the wake of the dissolution of the socialist federations, many authors 2 argued that ethnofederal institutions had entrenched identity politics and provided the institutional resources for elites to oppose the center.
Many authors have discussed the dangers (or otherwise) of ethnofederalism but few have analyzed India over time in detail. 3 Those that have done so used qualitative arguments only. This article provides a rigorous assessment of the Indian experience since independence, deploying a group level quantitative analysis, using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. 4 In the literature on ethnofederal design, India is generally regarded as a success. 5 Is this correct? This group level analysis, supplemented by qualitative assessments, reveals that while ethnofederal institutions have promoted stability in India, territorial redesign has increased conflict when groups are intermixed or autonomy has been downgraded. These findings are significant as the process of territorial redesign continues apace in India: the 29th state of the Indian Union, Telangana, was created in 2014. This has provided further encouragement for longstanding demands for the creation of states such as Gorkhaland (from West Bengal) and Vidarbha (from Maharashtra). These findings are also important as other regimes, many at an early stage of democratization, are currently experimenting with ethnofederal design, for example, Nepal. The lessons from the Indian experience should inform the constitutional reconstruction process in other divided societies considering federalization such as the Philippines and Myanmar.
The "dangers" of ethnofederalism Scholars and practitioners have been wary of recommending the territorial recognition of territorially concentrated groups. The creation of governing institutions that coincide with the boundaries of a group, creating a "homeland" for a group within the borders of an existing state, is assumed to pose a threat to the unity of the wider state. Thus, in states with multiple territorially concentrated groups, many politicians have either rejected the federal arrangement, as happened in Afghanistan in 2004, or have sought to deliberately cross cut group boundaries with internal governing institutions in what Liam Anderson terms "anti-ethnic" federalism. 6 In the case of Iraq, a mixed solution was adopted, with the Kurds subdivided between three governorates, with important areas such as Kirkuk left outside the control of the Kurdish Regional Government.
Despite these concerns, over half of the federations existing today intentionally associate "at least one constituent territorial governance unit [. . .] with a specific ethnic category." 7 This is Henry Hale's definition of an ethnofederation, which we adopt. As this article will demonstrate, although the arguments made against the adoption of ethnofederal institutions appear persuasive, they rest on assumptions about the operation of these ethnofederations. As Table 1 lists, there are 27 federations in the world today 8 ; 14 of these are ethnofederal by Hale's definition, just over half. 9 Historically, as Table 2 demonstrates, ethnofederations are more prone to failure than non-ethnofederal ones; 17 ethnofederations have failed compared to only eight non-ethnic federations. Failure is defined either by a Although we are dealing with a small number of observations, the picture is even more striking when we note that several of the failures of the non-ethnic federations are of very short-term mergers, borne out of decolonization, for example, the United Arab Republic (1958-61) and the Arab Federation (1958) . These data illustrate that the concerns of those who argue ethnofederal institutions are dangerous (usually from the point of view of maintaining territorial integrity) have a case to answer, and make India's "success" all the more striking. As will be outlined in the following sections, however, their arguments rest on particular assumptions about the nature of identity politics and do not take adequate account of the ways in which different institutional structures within the ethnofederal form can accommodate diversity while ameliorating separatist pressures.
Ethnofederalism encourages a sense of separateness
Those opposed to the creation of ethnofederal structures express concern that these structures will increase the desire for secession. They argue that autonomous institutions will promote the identity of the dominant group around which the borders have been drawn e.g. through promoting a group's language and culture. This was the reason that Nehru was concerned about acceding to demands for linguistically homogeneous units. Authors making this argument argue that it is in the interests of local elites to increase this sense of separateness. They do so by choosing the language(s) in which the unit operates and educates its children and university students, changing the curriculum to promote "their" group's heroes and version of history (thus influencing the next generation), as well as using the local media to depict "their" version of contemporary events (e.g. the Cauvery water dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in South India). Such control can solidify the boundaries of the group. By encouraging this sense of separateness, increasing the distinction between "us" and "them" (whether the "them" is a neighboring unit or is the center) ethnofederal institutions also increase the "group's cohesion and willingness to act." 11 As Philip Roeder argues; "(e)thnofederal . . . institutions tend to create or to keep alive conflicts in which the issue is not simply about rights of different ethnic communities within a common-state, but whether the communities even belong in a common-state at all." 12 
Ethnofederalism increases the resources with which to effect secession
The second argument made by those concerned about ethnofederalism is that it provides territorially concentrated groups with increased institutional resources. These include a democratically elected legislature and chief minister, allowing them to lobby for more resources and/or reject central legislation. 13 As a result, in Svante Cornell's words, "establishing political institutions increases the capacity of that group to act" and "also formalizes rules for succession, helping ensure that a 'national struggle' could withstand a change in leadership." 14 Thus, a Chief Minister of a state can legitimately claim a democratic mandate to oppose central policies, as Mamata Banerjee (Chief Minister of West Bengal) did in relation to the water sharing treaty in 2011. The creation of a homogeneous unit can also give an ethnically defined elite (assuming people vote along ethnic lines) control of governing structures, including security institutions.
As well as providing increased institutional resources, Dawn Brancati argues that regional parties are strengthened by territorial autonomy. 15 This increases the secessionist group's mobilization capacity: "regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favors certain groups over others, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism." 16 Thus, the Parti Québécois in Canada secured a mandate in 1994 to hold a secessionist referendum. Even those well disposed to ethnofederations (under certain conditions) note that it "seems clear that [they] make it easier for groups to secede should they want to do so." 17 Relations between groups within ethnically defined units are likely to be poor
The third argument made against ethnofederalism as a means of managing relations between groups, is that relations between groups within ethnically defined units are likely to be poor. Concerns are raised that the creation of ethnic homelands will lead to minorities inevitably being victimized. This can be for two reasons. Either they are discriminated against by the adoption of "ethnic" languages/cultures that they do not share, as some Anglophones have argued in Quebec. Or, they are marginalized by the discourse that has increased the perception of "us" versus "them." This marginalization can result in violence against a group, which may not be prevented (indeed, it may even be encouraged) by the homeland's control over local law enforcement, as was seen in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002. 18 This can be the case for local minorities who are a member of a nationally dominant group, or minorities who are "twice cursed" by being a minority in a federal unit and in the state as a whole. Relations between groups within ethnically "homogenous" units may also be strained by the existence of (often) significant minorities-whose numbers may well be increased through migration.
Limitations of these arguments against ethnofederalism
These three arguments are not without merit. However, they rest on the assumption that the institutional recognition of an identity through the creation of ethnic homelands will lead to an increase in the salience of that identity and that this increase will lead to secessionist pressures. Such an assumption is misplaced. The particular form of the ethnofederal system is relevant in explaining its success or failure, including the importance of power sharing arrangements, whether formal or informal. Also relevant is the timing of the implementation of ethnofederal arrangements as well as the particular demographics of these units. 19 It is impossible to deny that redesigning internal state boundaries to create institutional "homelands" for territorially concentrated groups grants these groups significant institutional resources. These resources are multiple. First, the creation of a linguistically homogeneous area creates an electoral territory within which political parties can win a mandate for their political program. The opponents of ethnofederalism have claimed that this political program is likely to oppose the center. However, this is not necessarily the case. As "[t]erritory can be seen as a primary guarantor of two fundamental human needs, identity and security," 20 creating an ethnofederal unit is an important affirmation of the "worth" of a group's identity. It also gives that group security, especially if the powers that are devolved to that unit concern control over education and culture. In Lars-Erik Cederman et al.'s words, "[t]he territorial nature of such provisions contributes to satisfying the group's concern about guaranteeing its physical security as well as the survival of its ethnonationalist identity." 21 Therefore, "[i]f the security of the ethnic group (as they define it) is promoted within a multi-ethnic state, the motivation to secede is diminished." 22 Identity conflicts are often the result of a security dilemma, 23 and increasing security through creating an ethnofederal unit reduces the political salience of an identity. This does not mean that the importance of the identity reduces, but it provides the conditions for different identities to co-exist as they are not in direct competition with each other. 24 This has been the case in India. Rather than leading to political balkanization and the breakup of the country, the reorganization solidified support for the Indian state and the Indian nation as attested by the strength of feelings across the country on the "Only National," "More National," or "Equally National and Regional" scale. 25 Although the importance of language did not diminish, the creation of linguistic states changed the focus of political parties. 26 The party system in many of the states traditionally seen as anti-center fractionalized. Tamils are the oft-cited example in support of this argument. 27 The trajectory of these regional parties has not been to oppose the Indian Union as authors such as Brancati would predict. After the creation of Tamil Nadu the DMK (opposed to upper caste northern Hindi domination), split into a plethora of Tamil regional parties, with a focus on capturing the state for its patronage. 28 As Adeney notes, "the multiplication of parties [in the states of India] has generally been indicative of federal stability because political parties have tended to not base their platforms on mobilizing against the center." 29 Therefore there is no necessary relationship between increasing institutional resources and a desire for secession. Not only is secession never the easy option, 30 but a rallying cry for secession will only be successful if the group feels its identity and interests are not protected within the ethnonational unit. If the instrumentalist position that identities are situational and subject to mobilization by elites 31 is accepted, then ethnofederal institutions create the conditions where it is not in elite interests to pursue secession. Elites need a motivation to pursue secessionism (and of course, the population needs to be motivated to respond to them). This motivation is more likely to arise if they do not have the opportunities to have their interests protected: whether these interests are defined in terms of the patronage that state power allows them to capture or in terms of cultural promotion. The Tamil Nadu example is a good example of both. When these opportunities are absent, conflict is likely to result.
The experience of ethnofederalism in India
Calls for the reorganization of units along ethnofederal criteria preceded the departure of the British. 32 In 1920 the Congress Party committed itself to the reorganization of the political map along linguistic lines and re-organized its internal party structure on this basis. 33 After the violence of partition however, Prime Minister Nehru expressed concerns that India would be Balkanized through such reorganization. 34 He was forced to concede the demand under pressure from within and outside Congress. 35 The initial reorganizations in the mid 1950s and 1960s were therefore on the basis of language. The reorganizations that followed in the Northeast of the country were based more on tribal identity than language. However, they must also be understood as ethnofederal. Most recent reorganizations such as those in 2000 were a complex mixture of identity, caste, tribal and developmental politics. 36 The creation of Telangana in 2014 was also a complex mix of the politics of dialect (rather than language) and historical developmental grievances. 37 16 of the 29 units existing in India today were created along ethnofederal lines. 38 In addition to these 16, as Table 3 makes clear, a linguistic group dominates the majority of India's states. Although the more recent reorganizations have been for more developmental and political reasons, using a country level analysis India must be understood as an ethnofederation.
However, when assessing the success of ethnofederations, it makes more sense to adopt a group level approach rather than a countrywide one. A group level approach focuses on the relationships that different groups have with the central government. This is empirically more rigorous than an approach that assumes that all groups will be equally satisfied (or dissatisfied) with the institutional structures of the state, and also allows for that fact that "the state is not an ethnically neutral institution but is an active agent of political exclusion that generates these conflicts." 40 The Ethnic Power Relations dataset 41 codes the extent and nature of group access to central power, whether that group has experienced Notes: Linguistic and religious data have been taken from the census that was held after the reorganization of the state in question. The only exception to this are Assam, Meghalaya, and Mizoram, the data for which were taken from the 1971 census, broken down into the new states. "Hindi" refers to the category of "Hindi/Hindustani." ENLG and ENRG refer to the "Effective" number of Linguistic and Religious Groups within a state rather than the absolute number of groups. This formula minimizes the importance of miniscule groups. 39 territorial autonomy, and whether that group has been in conflict with the center or another group. Although India is normally seen as a success in ethnofederal terms, it has only managed to maintain its territorial integrity through the use of extreme force in areas of its periphery, including Punjab, Kashmir and the Northeastern states. All of these, with the exception of Kashmir, were reorganized along "ethnic" lines. Is the conflict in these areas related to the failure of ethnofederal institutions? In the rest of this article we address this question. We do so using the Ethnic Power Relations and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), building on the work of Cederman et al. who test a number of hypotheses concerning the success (or otherwise) of ethnofederalism. 42 We confine our analysis to the South Asian data to assess the responsibility of ethnofederalism for territorial conflict in India. 43 We noted above that ethnofederalism can promote incentives to work within the existing state, and can encourage the development of dual loyalties. However, as Cederman et al. set out, such an outcome may also require power sharing at the center. 44 This is because "[ethno]federations in ethnically divided societies can help to promote autonomy and security for different communities, but not if they institutionalize majoritarian forms of government, as they all too easily can do." 45 We do so through posing two hypotheses.
H1. Violent conflict in India has occurred in states that are not ethnofederal.
H2. Violent conflict in India has occurred with groups that have been excluded from power sharing at the center.
H1. Violent conflict in India has occurred in states that are not ethnofederal
To assess H1 we utilize two variables. The first of these is the measure of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the states of India. These data are collated from the relevant Indian censuses. The second is the existence of territorial civil conflict, collected from the ACD Dataset, which has been mapped onto the EPR dataset. 46 We include all those internal conflicts that are related to territory. 47 We acknowledge the limitations of this database, which records as "conflicts" only those conflicts that have above 25 "battle-related" deaths in a given year. This database also does not take into account other forms of violence, such as missing persons. Although these data have limitations, they do reveal the conflict zones within India and their approximate start of conflict. Violent conflicts have emerged in Punjab, Jammu, and Kashmir and in several (although not all) of the states of the Northeast as Table 4 demonstrates.
As Table 4 reveals, the majority of the states having experienced conflict are extremely heterogeneous. As Deiwiks has argued, "regions can be ethnofederal to varying degrees." 48 The States Reorganization Commission of 1955 defined homogeneity as the presence of over 70 percent of one linguistic group. As Table 3 demonstrates, 12 out of the 29 states have less than 70 percent homogeneity on either linguistic or religious lines. Two of the Northeastern states (Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya) lack a majority on either linguistic or religious lines and Nagaland lacks a linguistic majority. The Northeastern states are additionally factionalized along tribal lines. Brendan O'Leary has argued that a Staatsvolk is important for federal stability. He defines a Staatsvolk as in existence when "the politically effective number of cultural groups must be less than 2 on the index of the effective number of ethnic groups" 49 (ENLG and ENRG in Table 3 ). Such a Staatsvolk is either "demographically [or] electorally dominant" and has "the ability simply to dominate the [unit] through its numbers, or instead to be generous-because it does not feel threatened." 50 Looking at these data we can see that Assam (from which Nagaland and Mizoram were carved out from in 1966 and 1972 respectively), has had consistently higher than 2 ENLG. This therefore makes it less likely that the Assamese would be magnanimous, and, indeed, the concession of Nagaland and Mizoram was made by Delhi rather than Guwahati.
Looking at the case of Nagaland (where conflict diminished but then continued), the ENLG was 11.25 in the new state-reinforcing the lack of de facto control over regional autonomy by one group. In contrast, the state of Mizoram, created as a Union Territory in 1972 with an ENLG of 1.77, has been much more stable. 51 Tripura ostensibly looks like an exception to this rule. However, its inter-ethnic conflict is a "sons of the soil" one: its conflict primarily caused by an influx of migrants from Bangladesh. Most of the migrants spoke Bengali, the majority language, and therefore the ENLG score cannot capture the dynamic of the Scheduled Tribes' (STs) privileges being threatened.
Turning to other conflict zones, Paul Brass argued that the reorganization of the Punjab was so "imperfect" that it "has never been completed." 52 The state was only reorganized after the demand was re-couched in linguistic rather than religious terms (and it is significant that it was conceded only after the death of its implacable opponent, Jawaharlal Nehru). Thus, in the 1971 census Sikhs comprised only 60 percent of the reorganized Punjab's population. The influx of predominantly Hindu Hindi speaking migrants in the 1970s as a result of the Green Revolution created a perception of a threat to this demographic balance. 53 Although the religious balance had not significantly changed between the 1971 and 1981 censuses and Punjabi speakers had increased from 79 percent to 85 percent of the state's population, the influx of "agricultural laborers, who were, of course, generally both nonPunjabi and non-Sikh" as well as "well-trained" Punjabis having to emigrate to get jobs, posited a "threat to the continuity of the Sikh cultural community . . . in Punjab." 54 This demographic threat was compounded by the centralization of the Indira Gandhi government, as will be discussed in more detail below.
Those units that retain high levels of diversity fail to achieve many of the benefits of ethnofederalism such as increasing the security of the group vis-à-vis the center and promoting the national self-determination of a group within a unified multinational state. This is a recommendation for the creation of as homogeneous units as possible. This is borne out in Northeast India. As James Manor observed, "its heterogeneities tend to go so far that they also undermine the politics of bargaining and with it the prospect for political stability. Accommodations tend not to hold in lands End date is given when a conflict year is followed by at least 1 year of conflict inactivity; it lists the date that violence stopped, although this may differ from peace agreements. The intensity variable is coded into two. "Minor" is defined as between 25-999 battle related deaths in 1 year. "War" is defined as at least 1,000 battle related deaths in 1 year. "Cumulative intensity" is defined as a conflict that has reached 1,000 battle related deaths since it started. Data for ENLG and ENRG taken from the census for the state in which the territory resided at the point the conflict started, e.g., from Assam for Nagaland in 1951, unless * Data taken from 1981 census, □ Data taken from 51st Report of Linguistic Minorities.
crisscrossed by so many multifarious tensions." 55 The continuing existence of sub-state diversity, despite "ethno-federal" reorganizations draws attention to the importance of investigating sub-state solutions for the territorial recognition of diversity where groups are not large enough to create states around, as has been adopted with partial success in Tripura, where the creation of an Autonomous District Council under the Sixth Schedule has gone some way to ameliorating the demand for a separate state for the indigenous tribes of Tripura. The concession of the Bodoland Territorial Council has been less successful in Assam, because of the continuing high levels of diversity within its borders-including a majority of non-Bodos.
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H2. Violent conflict in India has occurred with groups that have been excluded from power sharing at the center To assess this hypothesis, we utilize three variables. The first of these is the "group-level data on ethnic groups' access to executive power" described by Cederman et al. 57 This covers all "politically relevant ethnic groups" and/or those "directly discriminated against by the government." This variable in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset is split into three: 1. A group rules alone; 2. Shares power; or 3. Is excluded from executive power. The second variable is also taken from Cederman et al; the existence of "territorial power sharing by ethnic groups." 58 The third variable is the existence of armed conflict, collected from the ACD, as described when assessing H1. 59 In 2015 Cederman et al. found that "the conflict-reducing impact of full inclusion through central power-sharing is especially strong, but regional autonomy also has a pacifying effect vis-à-vis exclusion."
60 Their finding questions the arguments of authors such as Roeder who caution against the adoption of ethnofederal institutions. But does this conclusion also apply to India? In the South Asian portion of the dataset we find confirmation for Cederman et al.'s H1, that included groups are less likely to rebel than those that are excluded (Model 1, Table 5 , −2.032***). We are however, unable to confirm their H2, that territorial autonomy in the absence of central power sharing will lead to less conflict than those groups that are completely excluded (Model 1, Table 5 , 0.311). There is no statistically significant difference in the onset of conflict between groups that had territorial autonomy and those that did not. Territorial autonomy is neither correlated with the onset of conflict or its absence in South Asia compared to those groups that possessed neither territorial autonomy nor access to central power. Territorial autonomy thus seems to neither increase nor decrease the potential for conflict in South Asia.
However, Model 3 in Table 5 demonstrates that autonomy when combined with central power sharing significantly reduces the chances of an onset of conflict (−1.766*). This confirms the qualitative assessments made of the Indian case; where the Congress' national reach ensured that the overwhelming majority of linguistic groups (after the reorganization of states) were represented within the party and hence the government. After the decline of the Congress, the rise of regionally based parties (whether or not they were defined by a regional agenda) and the need for coalitions including these parties to form governments at the center (at least until 2014) has maintained the regional diversity of Indian cabinets, especially Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Models estimated using logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Variables "inclusion with autonomy," "downgraded from autonomy," and the interaction variable "inclusion without autonomy x postwar" from Cederman et al.'s analysis omitted due to collinearity. 61 with regard to maintaining the North-South balance. 62 In addition to the representation in governing institutions at the center, an important element of the Indian success has been the three language formula, providing India's multiple linguistic minorities with the institutional recognition of their language, including the right to sit government exams in that language. 63 Central power sharing is therefore important, although all groups do not seek it as control of the unit confers more opportunities to distribute patronage. 64 When a group had autonomy but did not have central power sharing, then the chance of future conflict could not be accurately predicted -meaning that it was neither more nor less likely (Model 3, Table 5 , 0.435). These data indicate that territorial autonomy without central power sharing is ineffective at preventing conflict, although it does not provoke more conflict. Why might regional autonomy in the absence of power sharing be more dangerous in the South Asian environment than in the wider dataset? There are a number of possible explanations, which we address in the following paragraphs.
First, although groups may have been given territorial autonomy, "secession and violence in the territory of many failed federations followed directly from attempts by certain groups to centralize these federations." 65 Cederman et al. therefore posit a relationship between the downgrading of autonomy and the onset of conflict. Downgrading from autonomy is described by Cederman et al. as a situation when groups experience centralization, defined as a decline in regional autonomy within the previous 2 years. 66 We widen their definition to define the "downgrading" more widely-including groups experiencing centralization within the last 5 or 10 years as shown in Models 5 and 6 in Table 6 .
Cederman et al. found confirmation that there was a relationship between the removal of autonomy and the onset of conflict. 67 Using the South Asia dataset shown in Table 6 , in which we adapt Cederman et al.'s model, we find a statistically significant relationship between the loss of autonomy over the past 5 or 10 years and an increase in the onset of conflict. 68 This relationship is significant at the one percent significance level.
Qualitative assessments of the conflicts in Punjab, Jammu, and Kashmir and most of the Northeastern states demonstrate why this is the case. 69 Many (although not all) of these so-called "peripheral" states of India have experienced a disproportionate amount of President's Rule being applied to them. As Adeney has analyzed, using data on the number of days a State/UT has spent under President's Rule (when the central government has suspended the State legislature), out of the top five States, three are in the "peripheral" regions, with Punjab topping the list. 70 Many (although not all) of the Northeastern states have similarly been the subject of extended periods of President's Rule. 71 President's Rule (Article 356) can be applied when "a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution." Although it is not unusual for federations to contain emergency provisions, India has been exceptional for the politicized use of the provision. 72 Although demands for further autonomy were made after the reorganization of the Punjab, most these demands concerned "tradable" issues such as the redrawing of the state's borders, the location of the state capital and access over river waters. Secessionist violence only emerged when Indira Gandhi, after being re-elected at the center in 1980, imposed President's Rule on the state, and called new elections. Pursuing short-term political considerations, she patronized a Sikh preacher, Bhindranwale, to undermine her political opponents, the moderate Sikh political party. The increase in Although the situation of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be equated with the other States of the Indian Union, as Paul Brass analyzed, the case of Kashmir demonstrates a remarkably similar trajectory. 75 Integrated into India on contested terms, its special status under Article 370 of the Indian constitution has gradually been whittled away to an extent that it is virtually meaningless. Disquiet with the Indian Union only boiled over into armed conflict in 1988, after the rigging of the 1987 state election. 76 As Sumantra Bose analyzed, the commitment of Nehru to democracy in Kashmir was superseded by the need to maintain a stable state. "Kashmir's democratic aspirations were thus callously sacrificed at the alter of the 'nation' to which Kashmiris were expected to be loyal." 77 What is significant is that Kashmir, subject to electoral manipulation during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, took until the late 1980s to develop into an insurgency. 78 The rigging of the 1987 election confirmed for many the impossibility of effecting change within the "system" and (partially supported from Pakistan) a serious conflict erupted, resulting in the deaths of between 40-75 K people since 1992. 79 Although not a technical element of a downgrading of autonomy as measured by Cederman et al., 80 the willingness of the center to intervene using high levels of force in the "peripheral" States must also be considered. The periphery of India has been treated differently from the mainstream in this regard, with the willingness of New Delhi to securitize responses in these areas through the use of mechanisms such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). 81 Although this has been covered in depth elsewhere, a contemporary example illustrates the point. The reaction of New Delhi to the Patidar/Patel protests in the summer of 2015 saw increasingly violent protests in the state of Gujarat. 82 Around 10 people lost their lives, many at the hands of police bullets. Although the army was deployed in Gujarat, the situation is incomparable to New Delhi's response in Kashmir a year later, when people took to the streets to protest the killing of a popular secessionist leader, Burhan Wani. The Indian state responded with the use of pellet guns, which, within six months, were estimated to have killed nearly 100 people and injured a further 6000-almost 1000 of these suffering injuries to their eyes. 83 Many were innocent bystanders; several of the victims were under ten. The areas of India that have experienced violent conflict are all border regions, and overwhelmingly (although not exclusively) those with a nonHindu majority. One obvious counter argument to the point that the conflicts are the result of institutional design and patterns of governance within India, is the involvement of outside forces in the promotion of conflict. It is widely accepted that Pakistan has played a role in the Kashmir conflict, and has had a hand in fomenting other movements against India. 84 Cross border support has also been forthcoming from tribes across the India-Myanmar border and allegations have been made about Chinese support for some of the groups in the Northeast fighting the Indian state. This support from outside actors obviously has a role in explaining some of the logistical support and the resources provided to the groups. But the fact that there were many missed opportunities to accommodate the demands of the groups in the Punjab and Kashmir demonstrates that, rather than having been caused by ethnofederal concessions, violent conflict is "related to the fact that these states have been treated differently from the rest of the Union" 85 and their effective autonomy has been reduced rather than increased.
Conclusion and lessons for other federations
"It is simply wrong to claim, as Snyder and others do, that [ethno]federations are unworkable." 86 Federations differ in design and the argument in this article is that the success or otherwise of a particular federal system in terms of managing diversity depends on its design, regardless of whether it is an ethnofederation. The question as Grigoryan has posed it is "what makes ethnofederal bargains stable or unstable?" 87 Through rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis, this article has reached the following conclusions.
This article has demonstrated that ethnofederalism has not caused conflict in India. Where ethnofederalism has been conceded, the overall story is one of accommodation rather than an increase in secessionist pressures. This is because it has promoted security and a belief that the interests of the group are valued and protected by the wider state. Nowhere is this more evident in the fact that political parties promoting ethno-linguistic interests have mobilized not only in defense of their state but are also seeking central power, to capture it for their interests. The states of India that have continued to experience violent conflict after reorganization have been those in which sizeable pockets of diversity remain, for example, Nagaland and Assam, and it must be questioned whether they can even be termed to be "ethnofederal."
However, although many of these areas that have experienced conflict cannot be said to be ethnofederal units, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that autonomy combined with access to central power has significantly reduced the chances of an onset of conflict in those areas that are ethnofederal and were organized on linguistic lines. This point is worth reiterating because India has had an informal tradition of maintaining a north-south balance in governing institutions. This was during the Congress era but maintained during the era of coalition politics. The rise of the BJP may replicate the era of Congress dominance (it is too soon to say whether 2014 was an aberration) but the current basis of its support and the northern domination of Modi's cabinet, demonstrate the dangers. 88 Taken with the promotion of Hindi, not unique to Modi's government, but given a renewed lease of life since his election, the stage may be set for north-south tensions. As noted, the three-language formula was an important component of ethnofederal success in India, and a threat to its existence will be seen as an attempt to centralize.
Another danger that policy makers need to be alert to in ethnofederal systems is that of inter-ethnic conflict within ethnofederal units. Conflict between groups is not confined to federal states; some of the most violent conflict in the last 30 years has been between groups in unitary states, for example, Rwanda. There is, therefore, no necessary connection between persecution and the creation of ethnofederal units. It is however plausible to argue that ethnonational federal units with control over cultural and linguistic policy are more likely to repress minorities who do not share the ethnonational characteristic. Even though there may well be mechanisms by which the central government can secure minority rights in a federal system, it is easier for the center to intervene to protect minorities in a unitary system where the responsibility for law and order resides at the center. Even though federal systems provide for emergency intervention in the case of breakdown of law and order, such intervention depends on a) defining the situation as serious enough to warrant an intervention and b) the center being willing to intervene (as it notoriously was not during the Gujarat pogrom of 2002). 89 In addition, although constitutional provisions exist to protect both linguistic and religious minorities in India, for example, Article 350A-requiring states to "provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups," evidence exists in India that this has been ineffective. 90 The most recent report from the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities in India notes that "gross negligence has been shown in implementation of the Scheme of Safeguards for the Linguistic Minorities. Often the linguistic minorities are (sic) felt marginalized in their own land." 91 Although the center may have the de jure power to intervene, in practice it may fail to do so.
It is this argument with which policymakers should be most concerned. It is not hard to see why. Increasing the rights of an "in" group does not necessarily have to lead to the persecution of an "out" group (or groups). However, the tendency to prioritize the rights of "sons of the soil" may well increase conflict between groups as the identification of state/provincial institutions with a particular group's identity leads to the codification of that identity. One of the states with high levels of conflict, Assam, failed to even respond to the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities. 92 Therefore, the design of internal borders requires careful management. As Deiwiks' demonstrates, when "homogeneous" units remain relatively heterogeneous, the dangers of conflict are high. This is both in terms of failing to increase the control of the unit by the dominant group within that territory (who, as we see with the Bodos in the area of the Bodoland Territorial Council may not even be in a majority) and also in the potential targeting of minority communities within that territory. 93 Although this is not an argument against ethnofederalismindeed it is an argument for higher levels of homogeneity-we must be alert to the fact that high levels of homogeneity may be difficult to achieve, either because of population intermixing or subsequent migration into the area. For this reason, ethnofederal solutions may be problematic and sub-state autonomy solutions may well be more appropriate.
In terms of South Asia federal reform, the demands for "ethnic" provinces, such as in the Seraiki and Hazara parts of Pakistan, in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and in the Madhesi regions of Nepal, should not be feared, they likely to increase rather than decrease affinity with the central state. However, this comes with a caveat: such autonomy should be part of a wider accommodation of groups within central power structures. It will not be sufficient to focus on majoritarian democratization of these states. The representative nature of this democratization will be vitally important for continuing the federalization process in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. In addition, policy makers should concentrate on making the units as homogeneous as possible, and resist the temptation to "dilute" the groups through intermixing. Such a policy is likely to increase conflict, both internally within that unit, as well as with the center. 
